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ABSTRACT
Drawing on pragmatism and systems theory, this article analyses how participants in
the European Sectoral Social Dialogue in the metal and hospital committees under-
stand its effectiveness. We find that the participants have a broad understanding of ef-
fectiveness compared with the European Commission and existing research.
Participants do not dismiss the importance of direct effects on working conditions
in member states but downplay it in comparison with indirect effects from, and effec-
tiveness in, European Sectoral Social Dialogue. That is, horizontal learning, knowl-
edge sharing and pragmatic bottom‐up work to reach consensus are emphasised as
more prominent than top‐down regulatory effectiveness.
1 INTRODUCTION
Since the establishment of European Sectoral Social Dialogue (ESSD) in 1998, its ef-
fectiveness has received both political and scholarly attention. The European Com-
mission (EC) has expressed expectations that employer organisations and trade
unions negotiate European‐wide sectoral agreements, thereby contributing to EU in-
tegration and the cross‐industry European Social Dialogue (ESD). The EC has tried
to develop a strongly outcome‐oriented social dialogue, emphasising that ‘Effective
social dialogue is the cornerstone of the European social model. It is a prerequisite
for the functioning of Europe’s social market economy and crucial to promote both
competitiveness and fairness’ (EC, 2015; cf. EC, 1998; 2010a; 2010b; 2016).
The number of sectoral committees has more than doubled from 20 in 1999 to 43
today, covering most sectors and 80 per cent of the European workforce
(Eurofound, 2019). These committees have produced over 900 documents co‐signed
by employers and unions—in addition to the 100 outcomes from the cross‐industry
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ESD.1 However, scholarly research has expressed scepticism regarding the actual im-
pact from ESSD at national and European levels, because of the non‐binding nature
of most outcomes (De Boer et al., 2005; Degryse, 2015; Keller, 2003; 2008; Léon-
ard, 2008; Léonard et al., 2012; Perin and Léonard, 2011; Pochet, 2005).
This raises several questions. If the ESSD does not deliver according to expecta-
tions, why does it endure? Are the expectations from the EC and in scholarly research
unreasonably high? Or has the ESSD other ways of being effective? In short, what is
the point of ESSD if it does not deliver in regulating working conditions in EUMem-
ber States (MS)? Starting from existing analyses, we delve deeper into the
conceptualisations and expectations on effectiveness in ESSD. In particular, we want
to compare external expectations on ESSD coming from the EC and from academic
research with the practical experiences of the ESSD participants.
Most assessments of ESSD have focused primarily on the downward implementa-
tion of outcomes and less on the functioning of ESSD committees as an upward lobby
channel and arena for horizontal learning (Voss et al., 2018). Few attempts have been
made to understand the national social partners’ engagement and strategies (Léon-
ard, 2008). Only recently have some studies focused on partners’ interactions, goals
and nuanced interests (Perin, 2014; Weber, 2013). The present article contributes to
such bottom‐up and horizontal approaches by studying the experiences and expecta-
tions of national social partners taking part in ESSD.
Our aim is to understand the ESSD participants’ perceptions of effectiveness in re-
lation to the EC and external observers’ expectations and assessments. We will also
discuss the extent to which these perceptions resonate with varying national industrial
relations traditions and comment briefly upon sectoral differences. The analysis fo-
cuses on national social partners from five countries [Germany (DE), Italy (IT),
Poland (PL), Sweden (SE) and the UK] participating in ESSD committees in the hos-
pital and metal sectors.
Theoretically, the study is positioned at the intersection of pragmatism and systems
theory. This was inspired from previous studies using such theories in the analysis of
cross‐industry ESD (Hartzén, 2017; Seeliger, 2019; Welz, 2008). We explore the po-
tential of these theories in analysing ESSD, while adopting slightly different catego-
ries compared with previous research. More specifically, we apply the systems
theory‐related idea of polycontexturality to capture how effectiveness is observed
and evaluated from different perspectives (Luhmann, 2018; cf. Jansen, 2017).
The next section begins with the theoretical and methodological approach. There-
after, we reconstruct the accounts of effectiveness from the EC and scholarly research,
followed by a thematic analysis of the respondents’ experiences and
conceptualisations of ESSD effectiveness. The article concludes on the found
polycontexturality and paradoxes in how effectiveness is observed. A discussion of
how these resonate with national traditions of industrial relations is also included.
2 THEORY: OBSERVING EFFECTIVENESS
European Sectoral Social Dialogue is often approached from expectations that its
outcomes should affect working conditions and industrial relations in the EU MS
(EC, 2010a; 2010b; 2016; cf. Tricart, 2019). Thus, the number of binding agreements
1European Commission Social Dialogue Texts Database accessed 1 July 2019.
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produced is used regularly as a proxy for effectiveness (Smismans, 2008, cf.
Degryse, 2015; Keller and Weber, 2011; Pochet, 2005). From this perspective, scepti-
cism regarding the effectiveness is warranted because the majority of ESSD outcomes
are lobbying statements, procedural documents and soft instruments such as declara-
tions, tools and recommendations.
However, effectiveness may be approached from less measurable criteria, such as
shaping better economic and social conditions; improving competitiveness, fairness
and crisis resilience; or strengthening social partners’ operational capacity, generating
trust and building consensus (Van Rie et al., 2015: 211). Accordingly, we need to open
up the concept of effectiveness to give space for different actors’ experiences,
conceptualisations and valuations; that is, we approach effectiveness as a ‘sensitising’
concept (Blumer, 1954). Rather than evaluating effectiveness with an operational def-
inition, a wide definition is used to guide the empirical study: effectiveness refers to
whether something produces an effect, such as a material product, an event or situa-
tion, or a change in conditions or relations. In addition, the concept implies an artic-
ulation of outcome with intention, which in the context of social dialogue is
highlighted in definitions of effectiveness as ‘to achieve set objectives’ (Welz, 2008:
123). This means that effectiveness has an inherent evaluation aspect to it: intended
or wanted outcomes are marked as effective, whereas unintended, unwanted or absent
effects are placed on the ineffective side of the distinction (Luhmann, 2018; cf.
Dewey, 1939).
Thus, effectiveness in ESSD is theoretically approached from the intersection of
pragmatism and systems theory. These approaches are rarely used in previous
research on ESSD, although applications in the analysis of cross‐industry ESD
indicate their potential (Hartzén, 2017; Seeliger, 2019; Welz, 2008). Seeliger (2019:
82ff.) has noted that ESD participants are confronted with challenges and problems
and communicate these to develop joint problem formulations and decisions through
pragmatic adjustments. From a systems theory perspective, ESD may thus be said to
‘regulate not only through performance, but also by influencing centres of reflection,
i.e. in our case the European social partners and institutions’ (Welz, 2008: 34). From
these points of departure, we conceptualise ESSD committees as self‐regulatory,
meaning constructing and learning processes that spill over into (i.e. ‘irritate’) other
policy processes in the EU or in the MS. Thus, the ESSD committees are viewed as
organisations in the systems theoretical sense, as operatively closed systems for deci-
sion making, structurally coupled to their internal and external environment, that is,
to the individual participants and other organisations (Luhmann, 2018). The EC may
accordingly ‘irritate’ (stimulate or spill over into) the self‐observations and internal
operations (decision making) in ESSD but do not determine their outcome.
Compared with actor‐centred or neo‐functionalist approaches, pragmatism and
systems theory emphasise that neither individual actors’ or organisations’ intentions
nor the effects of their operations are directly accessible. Instead, intentions and
effects are found through action, decision making and self‐observation/other
observation (Joas, 1996: 148–167). This approach seems appropriate to analyse
conceptualisations of what is and what is not effective in the ESSD, because it high-
lights that observers must draw distinctions between what is and what is not intended
and what is and is not a cause/effect, in order to be able to observe and communicate
means‐ends and cause‐and‐effect relations. Thus, the means‐ends schema ‘fulfils a
selective function for perceiving and evaluating the consequences of action’,
self‐reflectively (Joas, 1996: 152). Similarly, cause–effect is ‘understood as a schema
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of an observer’, who selects and attributes effects to causes from an ‘infinite horizon of
possible causes and effects’ (Luhmann, 2018: 140f.).
While these conceptualisations might seem overly abstract, relevant ESSD actors
are well aware of such problems. The measurement problem is acknowledged in the
Guidance for Assessing Social Impacts within the Commission Impact System, because
‘in the social area it is crucial not only to take into account the intended effects but
also to identify and analyse effects which might occur unintentionally’ (EC, 2009:
3). With regard to intentions, participants in ESSD often state that a crucial driver
of dialogue is selecting the topics for the work programme before deciding what end
(i.e. what outcome and effect) to jointly aim for.
Thus, when dealing with experiences and conceptualisations of effectiveness in
ESSD, we are observing actors observing their own and others’ operations with the
help of distinctions indicating intentions and effects, retrospectively evaluating what
is effective. This brings the distinctions used by the observers into focus. However,
the evaluative distinctions used by the EC do not always coincide with those used
by social partners at the national and European levels. The basic concepts used in
ESSD committee operations are grounded in different practical challenges and mean-
ing contexts, and their cognitive and normative content varies across countries,
sectors and organisations (cf. Barbier, 2013). This illustrates the problem of
polycontexturality (Luhmann, 2018: 36, 54); that is, the distinctions used to observe
and evaluate effectiveness are multiple and heterogeneous. The bivalent logics that
actors or organisations use to distinguish, select and mark an outcome as intended
or not, wanted or unwanted, effective or ineffective, differ. This creates misunder-
standings, tensions and paradoxes and can even mean that ‘each side rejects the
position of others without understanding the logic from which this opposition results’
(Jansen, 2017: 58). A major background of this multifaceted nature of observation
and understanding is the variation in industrial relations traditions, challenges and
interests, from which the social partners from different countries and sectors depart
(Barbier, 2013; Caprile et al., 2018; Hyman, 2001).
3 METHODOLOGY AND MATERIALS
The study is based on material collected during 2016–2017. EC policy texts and pre-
vious research were examined to reconstruct the external observations of effective-
ness. We contacted all trade unions and employer organisations in DE, IT, PL, SE
and the UK belonging to the ESSD committees in hospital and metal and conducted
Table 1: Interviews with representatives for social partners
DE IT PL SE UK
Hospital (18)
Trade union (13) 2 2 3 3 3
Employer organisation (5) 1 2 — 1 1
Metal (12)
Trade union (8) 2 2 2 1 1
Employer organisation (4) 1 1 — 1 1
Employers’ organisations in PL were approached but did not agree to participate.
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30 semi‐structured interviews (Table 1). Field notes from four full days of observa-
tions were used: one plenary meeting and one working group meeting in each ESSD
committee. In addition, material from the metal and hospital ESSD secretariats and
from the Social Dialogue Texts Database was collected. All data were analysed to re-
construct the multiple meanings of effectiveness from the points of view of the EC and
existing research, and the ESSD participants themselves. For research ethical reasons,
we mainly summarise the information from the interviews, with short quotes used
only as illustrations. As several interviewees have requested, we committed to safe-
guard the confidentiality of their views. Therefore, we refer only to the interview num-
ber and country and only for quotes longer than five words.
The five countries were selected to include representatives from key regimes of na-
tional industrial relations in Europe (Caprile et al., 2018) and the sectors to represent
different types of sectoral industrial relations (Bechter et al., 2012). Metalworking is
representative of private manufacturing industries, whereas hospitals are predomi-
nantly public. Both sectors are of national importance and have well‐established na-
tional industrial relations structures—factors that are seen as prerequisites for a
well‐functioning ESSD (EC, 1998; Meardi and Marginson, 2014). The sectors were
suitable for comparison because both belong to the third generation of ESSD and
have produced a similar number of outcomes (Table 2), placing them in an average
position among all 43 ESSD committees in terms of productivity (Degryse, 2015).
The hospital ESSD was launched in 2006, after six years of informal dialogue. With
coordination from their European umbrella organisations EPSU (European Public
Service Unions) and HOSPEEM (European Hospital and Healthcare Employers’
Association), the partners have concluded 15 texts, including a framework agreement
(FA) in 2009 on the prevention of sharp injuries, which was later turned into the
so‐called Needle‐Stick Directive (2010/32/EU). This FA was produced under the
Table 2: ESSD outcomes in hospitals and metal (July 2019)
Hospitals Metal
Binding framework agreements
Agreement—council decision (directive) 1
Autonomous agreement
Process‐oriented texts with follow‐up procedures
Framework of action 1
Follow‐up report 3
Guidelines and codes of conduct 2
Policy orientations
Soft outcomes without follow‐up procedures
Joint opinions 4 5
Declarations 3 5
Tools 1 2
Procedural texts
Rules of procedure1 1
Total 15 13
Source: EC Social Dialogue Texts Database.
1 Rules of procedure for the hospital committee exist but were not included in the database.
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‘shadow of the law’ (Bercusson, 1992), that is, after the EC stated its intentions to
draw up a directive, incentivising the social partners to take action. Other outcomes
range from joint projects and codes of conduct, such as that on the recruitment of
the healthcare workforce in 2012, to joint declarations such as that on continuous
professional development and lifelong learning in 2016. Overall, the central topics
have mainly focused on staff recruitment, skills and health and safety issues.
The metal ESSD was established in 2010 after having been an informal working
group since 2006. The partners have produced 13 joint texts, with coordination from
their European umbrella organisations IndustriAll (previously EMF) and CEEMET
(European Tech & Industry Employers). None of these outcomes are binding. How-
ever; some of the actors were involved in negotiating the 2006 multisectoral FA on
workers’ health protection through the good handling and use of crystalline silica
and had thus experienced negotiations of binding outcomes (Degryse, 2015). The cen-
tral topics of the metal ESSD committee are training, competitiveness and employ-
ment, digitalisation and industrial policy, and the partners have worked on several
joint projects, such as plant visits, meetings on skills challenges and a website.
4 EXTERNAL OBSERVATIONS OF EUROPEAN SECTORAL SOCIAL
DIALOGUE EFFECTIVENESS
In 1998, the EC reorganised existing informal sectoral dialogue into formally
recognised ESSD committees (Dufresne et al., 2006; Keller and Weber, 2011). The
rationale was a ‘need’ for social partners to ‘participate actively in discussion on the
improvement of living and working conditions in their sector’, and sector committees
were ‘the most appropriate means of ensuring such participation’ (EC, 1998). Expec-
tations of the ESSD have since been high and can be traced back to various EC
documents. The EC claims that the ESSD ‘plays a crucial role in promoting compet-
itiveness and fairness and enhancing economic prosperity and social well‐being’ and
that the social partners ‘play a key role in developing EU social policy and defining
European social standards … helps boost economic growth, create jobs and ensure
workplace fairness’ (EC, 2016: 3, 6). These goals have been regarded as somewhat
contradictory and shifting in balance over time (cf. Tricart, 2019). Because
our focus is on the conceptualisation of effectiveness, we will not delve deeper into
this here.
Although EC documents revolve around intentions and effects, ‘effectiveness’ has
never been explicitly defined. However, our document analysis shows a primary focus
on downward implementation: there should be ‘effective implementation of its out-
comes at national, local and company level’ (EC, 2010b: 9). Furthermore:
[ESSD]‐success derives from a high level of shared ambition amongst social partners and their joint
commitment to effectively represent their member organisations at European level, respond effectively
to consultations on EU policy initiatives, identify relevant topics of common interest, engage in mean-
ingful discussions, actions and/or negotiations on these topics, and actively follow up and implement
the outcomes. (EC, 2010b: 6)
Such ‘downward’ focus implies that binding agreements, particularly those trans-
formed into directives, are the flagships of ESSD effectiveness (EC, 2010a; 2010b;
2016; Tricart, 2019). The reason is that ‘the capacity of European sectoral social dia-
logue to improve working conditions throughout Europe depends on outcomes being
implemented in the workplace’ (EC, 2010a: 17). Thus, binding agreements are ranked
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at the top of all outcomes, followed by follow‐up procedures (actions, guidelines and
codes of conduct), whereas soft instruments (joint opinions and tools) and procedural
texts (such as rules of procedure) are usually placed at the bottom (Degryse, 2015;
EC, 2010a; 2010b; Keller and Weber, 2011; Pochet, 2005).
The EC occasionally acknowledges the ‘horizontal’ dimension, when discussing
ESSD as arenas for ‘trust‐building, information sharing, discussion, consultation, ne-
gotiation and joint actions’ (EC, 2010a: 5; Van Rie et al., 2015). ‘Upwards’ effective-
ness is also referred to briefly, in that ‘joint opinions and common contributions to
consultation have also proved to be powerful instruments for influencing European
policies or defending a sector’s interest’ (EC, 2010a: 9). In addition, Weber (2013)
found that some ESSD participants actually rank tools higher than other outputs
because of their practical usability, while Tricart (2019) showed how the EC itself
does not always support the production of hard regulation in practice.
4.1 Previous research on outcomes and obstacles
Despite these reservations, there is a tendency in research evaluations of ESSD to—at
least implicitly—depart from a conception of ‘effectiveness’ as binding regulation af-
fecting national working conditions. As discussed by Seeliger (2019: 32ff.), research in
this field often balances Euro‐optimistic perspectives emphasising the potential of
supranational dialogue and pessimistic or sceptic approaches showing the obstacles
and limited impact of ESSD at the national and European levels (Bechter
et al., 2017). Underlying both, however, is the recurring expectation that
European‐level social dialogue could/should deliver more in terms of national
regulatory and harmonising effects.
Early assessments of ESSD provided grounds for pessimism. Commitment from
the EC and the partners was initially expected to be only half‐hearted, given that cen-
tral issues like wages were formally excluded from the discussion, and envisaged dif-
ficulties in the implementation of outcomes (e.g. Keller, 2003). Consequently, the
ESSD structures were regarded as weak compared with national‐level ones—which
is indicative of the reference point for evaluation. Scholars warned against being
impressed by the increased number of ESSD committees and outcomes, because these
tended to include both less well‐functioning committees and texts of a mainly sym-
bolic or lobbying nature (De Boer et al., 2005; Keller, 2008).
It has been shown repeatedly that only a low percentage of the outcomes were bind-
ing, whereas most are joint opinions, declarations or tools without follow‐ups
(Degryse, 2015; Pochet, 2005). In addition, the decreasing number of outcomes pro-
duced yearly indicated that ESSD was ‘not, in any general sense, becoming more ac-
tive’ (Degryse, 2015: 44). Even if the soft outcomes could have a potential for
governance (Weber, 2013), their actual ‘regulatory capacity’ was deemed ‘weak’
(Léonard, 2008: 405; Léonard et al., 2011).
This ‘lasting stalemate’ (Keller, 2008: 219) was said to be due to the heterogeneity
of sectors, industrial relations in the MS and interests between unions and employers
—the former wanting more European regulation and the latter favouring more decen-
tralisation and soft tools. Social partners had diverging conceptualisation of what
‘dialogue’ should be (Léonard, 2008) and what the term ‘social partner’ implied
(Weber, 2013). Perin and Léonard (2011) claimed that the effectiveness of ESSD
depended on the ‘vertical relationship’ between the European federations and their
national affiliates: the upward representativeness, interest coordination and
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mandating, and the involvement, commitment and downward implementation.
Among the other obstacles identified were that some countries lacked adequate sec-
toral structures for implementation and that ESSD work tended to be decoupled from
the core business of collective bargaining of national partners. Because soft instru-
ments often aimed at the local company level, their coverage in implementation
was uneven and more difficult to monitor (Keune and Marginson, 2013).
The gap between the high expectations and potential and the low impact of ESSD
outcomes (apart from a few flagship FAs) raises questions regarding the point of
ESSD and its endurance. Why do actors continue to engage? Do the resources and ef-
forts invested pay off? Do participants share the assessments and expectations of these
external observers? To understand this, we will now turn to ESSD participants’
self‐observations of effectiveness.
5 PARTICIPANTS’ SELF‐OBSERVATIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS
When asked about the expectations and outcomes of ESSD, the national representa-
tives had a wide‐ranging and nuanced view of what is effective and what is not. In our
analysis we identified three conceptualisations of effectiveness. The first relates to
perceived direct effects from ESSD, corresponding to actual impact in the MS. The
second concerns indirect effects from ESSD, which includes the benefits of participa-
tion ranging from learning and improving conditions in other countries to
safeguarding from unwanted developments. The third is effectiveness in ESSD and
has to do with the internal organisation and operations of the ESSD committees.
5.1 DIRECT EFFECTS ‘AT HOME’ FROM EUROPEAN SECTORAL SOCIAL
DIALOGUE
Unsurprisingly, many respondents acknowledged that ESSD should ‘make a differ-
ence’, or ‘trigger a change’, in order to be effective. The partners should jointly
‘improve something’ or ‘solve problems’. Some agreed with the external assessments
that FAs turned into directives are the most effective outcomes. This was particularly
frequent in the hospital sector, and primarily among unions, referring to the
Needle‐Stick Directive as ‘the flagship’ or the ‘jewel in the crown’ of their ESSD. Sim-
ilarly, union representatives in the metal sector referred to cross‐industry FAs (such as
the one on working time) and the multisectoral Silica agreement as successful achieve-
ments. Respondents from the UK and PL said that such hard outcomes had indeed
made a difference in working conditions, albeit ‘not to the same extent that the
2003 Working Time Directive had for Polish workers’ (#14, PL).
All softer ESSD outcomes were generally considered to have marginal effects at
home—as exemplified by a Polish union representative who stated: ‘besides these
[directives], there was nothing that had an influence on our national hospital sector’
(#14, PL). Some even downplayed the effectiveness of hard regulation. Swedish and
Italian representatives expressed reservations regarding the significance of the
Needle‐Stick Directive. Both countries had well‐established routines in healthcare,
for which the directive did not bring any radical change. Thus, in substantial terms,
ESSD outcomes were generally not seen as breaking new ground, changing much
or even being of much concrete use in the MS. In this sense, the actors’
self‐observations confirmed previous research findings.
Views were more polarised when discussing the expectations on ESSD. According
to trade union representatives from IT, the UK and PL, the limited effectiveness
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was due to the lack of ‘bite’ in form and content of ESSD outcomes, caused by re-
luctance from employers and the EC to support regulation through FAs. Conse-
quently, these representatives saw a need for ESSD to engage more with hard
outcomes and ‘core topics’, such as wages and employment, in order for effective-
ness to improve. For Polish and Italian unions, this relates to the weakening of col-
lective bargaining following the 2008 crisis and an expectation that membership in
the EU and its social dialogues could fill such a gap. Unions from DE mentioned
the need for the EC to encourage harder outcomes too but simultaneously
emphasised the lobbying function of ESSD towards the EC. For Swedish represen-
tatives, most outcomes had marginal importance, because they mainly cover issues
‘which the Swedish labour market parties worked on already before they came up
in the European agenda’ (#22 SE). A similarly sceptical approach came from some
UK unions in the metal sector because they saw limited scope to implement ESSD
outcomes nationally, given their voluntary and more lightly regulated employment
relations system.
Thus, the expectations of most ESSD participants regarding direct effectiveness
were relatively modest. Many representatives from the North and West (DE, the
UK and SE) thought that good practices, guidelines and joint statements were prob-
ably the most that could be expected—as illustrated by a Swedish trade unionist:
‘We actually do not have very high expectations of what’s coming out of it. We
think it’s very good that you have social dialogue between the partners at European
level at all’ (#23 SE). Union representatives from PL, IT and DE clearly hoped for
more, but it is uncertain how much they actually expected in terms of direct effects
from ESSD.
5.2 Indirect effects from European Sectoral Social Dialogue
If direct effectiveness was perceived as limited, important conceptualisations of indi-
rect effectiveness emerged in our analysis. These reside primarily in learning and in-
creasing understanding between partners and countries. Furthermore, soft
regulation was seen as useful at the national level, as reference points for ‘good prac-
tices’ and ‘accepted European standards’. They could help improve conditions in the
MS in the long run; as one UK unionist stated: ‘there is a quiet kind of low‐level im-
pact as well’, in ‘learning from one another’ (#27, UK). Such effects were said to be
contingent, however, because the applicability of tools is ‘tied to the nation states’ and
their different systems.
Preparation and participation in meetings, projects and conferences that did not
lead to formal outcomes were recognised as contributing to indirect effectiveness.
As exemplified by Swedish metal sector representatives, these effects may be specific.
In their case, social partners successfully lobbied the government to introduce
short‐term work based on examples from other countries. However, these indirect
benefits can also be general, as illustrated by a Polish representative: ‘We want to
be aware of the solutions that are being proposed in Europe […] This is extremely rel-
evant to us’ (#17, PL).
Such knowledge sharing was also evident during our participation in ESSD meet-
ings. In the metal sector, a regular item on the agenda is the ‘roundtable of national
developments’, which in some cases is jointly presented by employers and unions. An-
other example was the reporting of a joint field visit at an industrial plant to increase
knowledge about the consequences of digitalisation (field note, 14 December 2017).
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At the hospital ESSD committee meeting, representatives from the European em-
ployers’ association, HOSPEEM, offered a national trade union representative infor-
mation about their European semester country recommendations, which they had
difficulty obtaining (field note, 2 December 2016).
Another aspect of indirect effectiveness is that experiences from ESSD affect social
partner relations at the national level. ESSD was seen as a useful arena in which to
discuss common matters and some found ‘inspiration to bring home’. An Italian rep-
resentative of employers in the hospital sector mentioned that, ‘in ESSD meetings,
from two apparently irreconcilable positions you then end up finding a solution.
[…] this is something that I then take home with me’ (#10, IT). An employer repre-
sentative from a new MS expressed a similar view, saying that they were initially
against unions but that after attending and observing others at the ESSD committee
meetings in Brussels started to consider them as partners (field note, 2 December
2016). Another example is that Swedish representatives thought that ESSD improved
national partner relations through joint preparations: ‘we [unions and employers] co-
operate better together at home because we have to do it abroad […] I think it spills
over’ (#20 SE).
German, Swedish and the UK representatives stated that although some outcomes
were of little significance at home, they could bring improvements in other MS and
thereby indirectly protect their countries from downward competitive pressures. A
less solidaristic view of such indirect effectiveness emphasised the importance for
some participants of preventing EU interference on national matters. This is a con-
ceptualisation of effectiveness in which the preferred outcome is no change. The
UK, Swedish and German employer representatives in particular showed concern
about ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘national partner autonomy’. Their view was that ‘You
shouldn’t have rules for stuff that can be solved better on the national level’ (#22
SE), and even though ‘[It’s] very difficult to prove that, […] I do think that some of
[our] interventions have been quite effective’ (#28, UK). Swedish trade unions
discussed how the protection of their national system was a top priority: ‘Now and
then we need to be there just to defend stuff, like “we won’t let this go” ’ (#21 SE),
by such means as blocking regulations on minimum wages, education of assistant
nurses, ratios or elderly workforce in the hospital sector.
Finally, the respondents emphasised proactive lobbying towards the EC as an as-
pect of ESSD effectiveness. This was highlighted during a metal sector ESSDC meet-
ing in which an employers’ representative from CEEMET suggested that their ESSD
should be more ‘political’. This did not mean being ‘ideological’ or ‘social’ but ‘more
influential and strategic towards the EC in industrial policies’ (field note, 14 Decem-
ber 2017). This opinion exemplifies the ongoing debate on the aims of the ESSD and
the fact that lobbying may become more prominent in the future.
5.3 Effectiveness in European Sectoral Social Dialogue
A third conceptualisation of effectiveness emerging from the interviews concerned ef-
fectiveness in the ESSD, focusing on the engagement and representativeness of partic-
ipants, the internal organisation of the ESSD committees, and the selection of topics
to work on and outcomes to aim for.
The respondents associated such effectiveness with continuous, regular participa-
tion by representatives who are engaged and competent in the topics and have a man-
date to make decisions. From this point of departure, representatives in both sectors
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questioned the actual effectiveness of their ESSD. Participation from many countries
was irregular; the individuals who were sent would change and would not always have
a clear mandate: ‘You have lots of people who work on something, say on a topic of
the ESSD, but then disappear’ (#7, IT). In some cases, the absence was compensated
through aggregated representation: an Italian metal union representative thought it
was sufficient to take part in the IndustriAll committee discussions, while a Swedish
unionist stated that they were also speaking for the other Nordic countries in
their ESSD.
In addition, not all relevant organisations at the national level were represented. In
the hospital ESSD, some private and regional public organisations on the employer
side were not present; in metal, both trade unions and employers’ representatives in
several countries were self‐critical about their side’s ability to represent the whole sec-
tor. Some also saw problems in the variation in how engagement was understood:
‘For some, it’s important that “When I attended the meeting in Brussels, I said some-
thing!” That’s engagement for someone, [whereas] for others engagement is to bring
the question home and [discuss] “Can we do anything?”’ (#21 SE).
Another aspect of effectiveness in ESSD concerns the preparation for the meetings.
The secretariats of European unions and employers’ organisations collect and distrib-
ute information before meetings. Such operations were seen as key, along with infor-
mation being ‘accessible’ but not ‘excessive’ in order for effective preparation and
participation to emerge. Preparedness from national partners was said to increase ef-
fectiveness, as it did when the EC takes active interest. Effectiveness at the meeting
also increased when agenda and the tasks of working groups were clear. References
were made to ineffective situations in which a lack of clear aims compromised prep-
arations for decisions and the process had to be restarted.
Even more important for effectiveness in ESSD was the selection of topics for the
work programmes, because this affects engagement and implementation. A recurrent
observation was that only topics that are chosen consensually lead to productive
meetings and outcomes. However, as most employers and many Nordic unions ‘steer
clear of detailed regulation’, tensions arise with those aiming to achieve binding out-
comes on core topics. As a representative in metal stated: ‘Real collective bargaining
about working hours or salary levels, that’s not on the map; and to engage in sym-
bolic collective bargaining is destructive’ (#24 SE). Consequently, reaching agree-
ments on the work programme is a political process, in that powerful and central
actors or alliances may block or promote topics.
In line with the pragmatic understanding of intentions, many respondents consid-
ered the decision of which outcomes to aim for as secondary to the selection of
topics. Even though the work programmes contain both topics and aimed for out-
comes, the latter can be set only after deciding topics through consensus. Thus, a
contradiction emerges between effectiveness in and from ESSD. Some respondents
claimed that everything driving the discussion forward contributes to effectiveness
in ESSD, even if it does not ‘lead to something written’. This implies that opting
for binding agreements is not necessarily effective, because employers and Nordic
unions would seldom be willing to cooperate unless pressured by the EC. Whereas
some unions and employers expressed frustration over the EC’s ‘bureaucratic’ out-
come counting as a measure of effectiveness, most trade unions from the UK, DE
and IT wanted more engagement and encouragement from the EC in aiming for
binding outcomes.
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6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study aimed to juxtapose the experiences of effectiveness of the participants in
the hospital and metal ESSD against the expectations expressed by the EC and in ac-
ademic research. In doing so, we applied the theoretical approaches of pragmatism
and systems theory, to explore their potential to bring new light to old issues.
Thereby, the article contributes to the bottom‐up and horizontal approaches to ESSD,
while placing them in relation to the external and top‐down expectations and evalua-
tions of ESSD effectiveness. Consequently, it also sheds light on the participants’
views on what the point of ESSD is and why it endures, despite its inability to deliver
according to normative expectations.
The empirical analyses indicate a marked difference between the external observa-
tions from the EC and scholars and the self‐observations of participants in ESSD
committees. The latter do not focus primarily on direct effects in terms of outcomes
to be implemented in the MS but instead emphasise the indirect effectiveness from
ESSD. This consists of mutual learning, knowledge and practice sharing, and inspira-
tion, trust building and even blocking unwanted regulation or negative effects at
home. The participants in ESSD also emphasise effectiveness in ESSD; namely, its in-
ternal organisation and processes to decide on topics and aims.
When analysing these conceptualisations with the systems theoretical concept of
polycontexturality—emphasising the importance of observing the multitude of dis-
tinctions that the actors apply to evaluate effectiveness—it is possible to unpick three
main perspectives or ‘vectors’ from which effectiveness is observed in EESD (cf. Jan-
sen, 2017; Luhmann, 2018). After presenting these vectors, we discuss the extent to
which understandings of effectiveness resonate with national industrial relations tra-
ditions and what the main differences in such understandings are between the hospital
and metal sectors. At the end, we will highlight some main implications from this
pragmatist and systems theory‐based analysis of ESSD.
The first main vector in the observations of effectiveness corresponds to the pre-
dominant view of the EC and scholarly research, centred on top‐down implementa-
tion of binding results that directly affect industrial relations and working
conditions in the MS. This is mirrored in the conceptualisation of effectiveness as di-
rect effects from ESSD, as illustrated by recognition of FAs as the ‘flagships’ of ESSD
and from union representatives from IT, PL and DE arguing for more binding regu-
lation in core areas for the ESSD. However, this vector stands in paradoxical relation
to the observations of effectiveness in ESSD. In order to achieve direct effects in the
MS, the ESSD needs to operate effectively, but this requires ESSD to be based on
consensus, and there is seldom consensus in aiming for binding regulation. Instead,
to increase effectiveness and engagement, the topics and outcomes are chosen not to
create a direct impact in the MS.
By contrast, the second main vector traces effectiveness as bottom‐up influence
from national interests to the European level. This is an evaluative perspective that
is only occasionally referred to by the EC and research but is substantial for the na-
tional social partners. This is captured by the conceptualisation of indirect effects from
EESD. It is explicated in the ambitions of employer organisations and Nordic unions
to block unwanted effects from ESSD and in the metal ESSD discussion about be-
coming more strategic towards the EC. This vector also implies a paradoxical relation
with effectiveness in ESSD, because social partners are faced with different national
challenges and industrial relations contexts (cf. Barbier, 2013; Caprile et al., 2018).
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What is most important for some (e.g. regulation of core issues for Polish and Italian
trade unions) is blocked by others to safeguard national autonomy in bargaining (em-
ployer organisations and unions from the Nordic countries).
The third vector is horizontal and evaluates effectiveness in terms of mutual learn-
ing, understanding, respect and trust building. This perspective is strongly linked to
the observation of indirect effects from ESSD and is pragmatically oriented towards
finding the aims of ESSD through joint, creative work (cf. Joas, 1996). The articula-
tion of intention with outcome is not entirely clear in this vector, as it focuses on ef-
fects that are beneficial without being explicitly aimed for. In other words, social
partners find mutual learning and knowledge sharing as effective outcomes of ESSD.
The emphasis of this vector in the self‐observations of actors connects to what
Welz (2008: 34) described as ESD ‘influencing centres of reflection, i.e. in our case
the European social partners and institutions’. From this point of view, it is not par-
adoxical that the ESSD work often proceeds by selecting the topics before deciding on
outcomes to aim for.
There is a closeness between these vectors and the three ‘functions’ of ESSD,
namely, ‘regulation’, ‘lobbying’ and ‘learning’ (Weber, 2013). However, as vectors,
they are simplified abstractions of a multitude of slightly differently angled observa-
tional distinctions, flexibly and pragmatically adapted by the individual and
organisational observers of the operations of EESD committees. This means that
we cannot expect the observations to be stable over time or internally consistent. Even
so, there are some general tendencies that indicate that these conceptualisations from
ESSD participants resonate with established empirical and ‘ideal typical’ classifica-
tions of national industrial relations traditions (Caprile et al., 2018; Furåker and
Larsson, 2020; Hyman, 2001). The five national industrial relations systems may be
considered as articulating different tripartite relations. SE represents a tradition in
which the partners regulate a good deal of working conditions through autonomous
collective bargaining. The UK embodies a more liberal and voluntarist model. Thus,
for different reasons, European‐level regulation and coordination may not be what
the partners from these countries expect or value from social dialogue at European
level. The more conflictual and state‐centred Italian industrial relations model, and
the weak, fragmented and liberalised Polish system resonate with quite different ex-
pectations and engagement in European‐level social dialogue. While their representa-
tion may be expected to be lower, trade unions are more affirmative to binding
regulation. The German social partner tradition indicates a middling position, as
there is strong state regulatory framework for autonomous social partner bargaining.
In line with previous research (e.g. Perin, 2014; Perin and Léonard, 2011), our anal-
ysis showed that different expectations and evaluations regarding ESSD resonated
with such national perspectives. Whereas scepticism from Swedish participants was
due to a fear of interference of ESSD on social partners’ autonomous national
bargaining model, the Italian and Polish dissatisfaction was due to ESSD’s perceived
lack of bite, relating to national traditions of stronger third‐party guidance. German
participants seemed to have struck a balance between these two approaches, whereas
some UK representatives find their national arena more ‘immune’ to potential ‘irrita-
tions’ coming from outcomes (with the exception of directives, up until Brexit), given
the generally weak implementation by their home voluntary system.
The analyses also confirm research showing that employer organisations are less
keen to negotiate FAs and hard regulation than trade unions (Keller and
Weber, 2011). There were no notable differences in this between the sectors, despite
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metal ESSD having only soft outcomes, whereas the hospital ESSD had produced
both hard law and guidelines with follow‐up procedures. None of the employer
representatives hinted that hard outcomes would indicate effectiveness per se. On
the contrary, employers’ willingness to negotiate remained within the general stance
of protecting against unwanted regulation (cf. Bercusson, 1992). A notable
sector‐specific difference was a more explicit critique in the metal sector, and mainly
from employer organisations, towards measuring effectiveness by counting outcomes.
That was said to be a bureaucratic interest of the EC to ‘tick boxes’ and pressing the
ESSD committees to prove they were doing something worthy of financial support
from the EC.
Regarding indirect effectiveness, both employers and unions acknowledged that
knowledge, learning, understanding and respect were important products. However,
the work programmes of the metal and healthcare ESSD committees revealed notable
differences in their respective capacity to select topics and outcomes to aim for. The
patient‐centred nature of healthcare made it easier to agree on common interests, such
as the health and safety of workers and patients, training and sharing of best prac-
tices. In metal, there seems to have been more controversies around what topics to
work on. Digitalisation was recognised as central, but there were varying expectations
and degrees of engagement between employers and trade unions, while Polish repre-
sentatives considered digitalisation less important. In addition, there was more focus
on producing outcomes to ‘bring home’ in the hospital ESSD but more discussion
about sharing information about challenges and strengthening the upward lobbying
function in the metal ESSD. This is related to differences in sector‐specific industrial
relations. On the employer side, the hospital ESSD is dominated by public organisa-
tions that share interests and values relating to high‐quality care with the unions. To
some extent, competitiveness is a similarly common interest in the metal sector, which
chiefly makes lobbying the EC the most relevant strategy.
The analysis points at the polycontexturality and paradoxicality that are at play
when evaluating something whose intentions and outcomes are observed from vary-
ing points of departure and with distinctions that do not converge (Dewey, 1939;
Luhmann, 2018). The theoretical approach applied in the present article allows us
to observe that it is not only the national and European unions and employer organi-
sations and the EC that are ‘organisations’ in a systems theoretical sense but also the
ESSD committees themselves, because they are constructed as autonomous bipartite
committees. They are composed of members and produce decisions, which means
they are operationally closed from their environment while being open to informa-
tion. Their structural coupling to other organisations and to individual participants’
perceptions and actions is quite loose (Hartzén, 2017; Luhmann, 2018; Welz, 2008),
so they may be thought of as autopoietic—as operatively closed when reproducing
themselves through their own decisions. They operate by thematising irritation from
the environment—such as EC policy initiatives or national‐level challenges as com-
municated by individual representatives—and produce decisions on outcomes,
whether these are internal work programmes, FAs or soft tools. Thus, they may or
may not produce ‘irritation’ for similarly decoupled communication processes in na-
tional legislative bodies, collective bargaining, local workplaces or EU institutions.
Our approach highlights the point that ESSD committees are not ‘trivial machines’
that may be expected to produce outputs according to expectations from the outside
(Luhmann, 2018: 49ff.). Their outcomes are not determined by predefined intentions,
from either the EC or the MS, at least not without direct pressure from the EC
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through the ‘shadow of the law’ effect (Bercusson, 1992). Instead, in line with pragma-
tism, it seems that the ESSD committees as they function today find their own ‘inten-
tions’ through their operative processes (Joas, 1996; Seeliger, 2019). They thematise
external challenges into topics to discuss and then work out creatively what outputs
to aim for. They must solve their own problems operationally and may thereby only
indirectly help, inspire and irritate problem‐solving in their (national or European)
environment. The expectations and evaluations in national, EC and scholarly obser-
vations are not irrelevant for their operations, because they produce irritation for the
ESSD committees to thematise. However, it should also be acknowledged that such
external observations might not be fully adequate from the participants’ or ESSD
committees’ points of view. If this is seen as a shortcoming or problem in the current
functioning of the EESD committees, the main solution would be to couple the
EESDs tighter into the EC governance system, by (re)introducing a tripartite element
or using the power of the ‘shadow of the law’.
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